第4章 文本与草案：黑格尔从法兰克福到耶拿时期《精神现象学》之路(2)
The results of Schulze’s book and Fichte’s response were catastrophic for Reinhold’s career; his star sank as rapidly as it had risen, and Reinhold was never again to regain the prominence he briefly enjoyed. Paid the absurdly low salary typical of the professoriate at Jena, Reinhold accepted a better offer from Kiel in 1794 and left Jena for good just as his reputation was beginning a rapid slide downhill. Away from Jena, he came to abandon the Kantian critical philosophy entirely and to adopt a theory of philosophy as equivalent to logic, all of which pushed him even further toward the philosophical periphery at the time. Fichte arrived in Jena as Reinhold departed, and he quickly supplanted Reinhold as the great star in the German intellectual firmament. Although at first Fichte seemed to accept certain basic Reinholdian claims — in particular, the claims about the need to arrive at an indubitable starting point for philosophy, the related distinctions between the “premises and the conclusions,” and between the “spirit and the letter” of Kant’s thought, and the need only to “complete” Kant’s philosophy - in fact he was to effect a wholesale shift in the nature of the debate, moving it away from Reinhold’s worries and in the direction of asking how it was possible in the first place for there to be the kind of selfdetermining subjectivity that Kant claimed was necessary.'^ Fichte stopped asking how we “constitute” a web of experience and started asking instead about the authority for the norms by which we make judgments about that experience.
舒尔策书与费希特回应的结果对于赖因霍尔德的生涯是灾难性的。赖因霍尔德作为一颗已然升起的学术新星很快坠落，他从此再也没有回到他昔日短暂享有的辉煌。由于对在耶拿当教授薪水低得荒唐而感到失望，赖因霍尔德于 1794 年接受了基尔一个更好的教职且永远地离开了耶拿。就在此时，他的名声开始快速下滑。离开耶拿后，他开始彻底抛弃康德批判哲学，着手采纳相当于逻辑学的哲学理论，所有这些都进一步将他推向当时哲学的边缘。赖因霍尔德前脚走，费希特后脚到，费希特旋即取代赖因霍尔德，成了德国知识天宇中的巨星。虽然起初费希特看来好像认同赖因霍尔德的某些基本主张——特别是有关下列的种种主张：需要达到无可置疑的哲学起点、作出“前提与结论”之间的相关区分、作出康德思想的“精神实质与字面意义”之间的相关区分，以及仅仅需要“使”康德哲学“臻于完美”——但实际上他势必完全改变了这场争论的性质，势必使这场争论摆脱了赖因霍尔德的担忧，进而使这场争论朝着下列做法的方向发展：首先追问怎么可能存在那种被康德声称作为必需的有自决力的主观性。费希特不再追问我们如何“编织”经验之网，反而开始探问那被我们借以对经验作出判断的规范的权力。
Fichte’s principles are notoriously obscure, and Fichte spent many years trying to work them out before finally abandoning altogether his project of completing Kantian idealist philosophy. Fichte’s principles are, in their barest outline, something like the following. The first principle was the Kantian principle of the necessity of self- consciousness, which Fichte characterized as the principle of “I = F’ (and which he sometimes characterized as the Fs “self-positing”). The second principle was Fichte’s version of the Kantian notion that the unity of self-consciousness required some material to synthesize; Fichte characterized this necessity as the principle of the “Not-F’: The “F’ (the principle of the necessary unity of self-consciousness) is said to “posit” the not-I (that is, the necessary unity of self-consciousness requires some material that is not itself part of self-consciousness for its synthesizing activities to combine, and it must posit this material as something “other” than itself, something “given” to it).'^
费希特的那些原理是出了名的晦涩难懂，费希特用时多年试图将它们制定出来，然后最终完全抛弃他关于使康德唯心论哲学臻于完美的工程。费希特的那些原理是，从它们的毫无内容的轮廓意义上说，类似于下面的东西。第一条原理是康德关于自我意识的必要性原理，这条原理被费希特描绘为“自我=自我”原理（这条原理有时被他描绘为自我的“自我设定”）。第二条原理是费希特关于康德的自我意识的统一需要综合某种质料这个见解的翻版；费希特将这种必要性描绘为“非我”原理：“自我”（自我意识必需统一原理）被说成“设定”非我（就是说，自我意识的必需的统一需要某种质料，这种质料本身因自我意识的综合活动能起到组合作用而不构成自我意识的一部分，“自我”必需把这种质料设定成某种“不同于”它自身的东西，设定成某种“被赋予”它的东西）。
The third principle (which even Fichte himself had trouble stating and which went through numerous revisions) went something like this: Since the necessary unity of self-consciousness (Fichte’s “I = F’) itself necessarily requires something other than itself, but since it is necessary that it posit something as not-posited by itself, as “given,” it finds itself in a “contradiction” between holding that everything is a “posit” by the “F’ and that among the things that the “F’ must posit is that not everything with normative force is a “posit.” Because, Fichte argued, an agent cannot abide such a contradiction at the heart of his selfconception, he must eternally strive to overcome this contradiction by showing how any apparent “not-F’ (a brute “given” serving as a norm of judgment) is actually not just a “given” but can in fact be shown to be constructible out of what counts as the necessary conditions of selfconsciousness itself.'"^
第三条原理（这条甚至就连费希特本人也难以加以陈述且被演绎出众多版本的原理）内容大致如下：因为自我意识的必须的统一（费希特的“自我=自我”）自身必须要有某种与它自身不同的东西，但是因为它必须将对象设定为不是由某物自己设定的东西，必须将对象设定为“给予的东西”，所以它发觉自己陷入两种“自相矛盾”的认识中：一切事物都是由“自我”“设定”的，与其中“自我”必须设定的是有些东西由于规范的力量而成了“设定物”。因为，费希特辩称，行动者不能容忍自我概念深处的这种自相矛盾的认识，所以行动者必须借助下列的做法永远奋力克服这种自相矛盾的认识：说明任何貌似真实的“非我”（一个用作判断规范的无情的“给予物”）实际上都不只是“给予物”，而其实都能被证明是用被认作自我意识自己必需的条件建构的。
To put Fichte’s conclusion in another way: None of the “givens” of experience possess any certainty, any unrevisability; their status as objects of knowledge is a status bestowed on them by our own selfgrounding activity.'^ Even the status of a relatively simple experience, such as “something looks red,” which just seems to be “given” to us, is a status that we bestow on that experience: It “looks” red to us because we construe it in terms of color concepts, in terms of something like, “the way things that really are red look in certain lighting conditions,” and so on.
换一种方式论述费希特的结论：经验的“给予物”一律不拥有任何必然性，一律不拥有任何非修正性；经验的“给予物”作为认识对象的地位是一种由我们自己的自发活动赋予经验“给予物”的地位。甚至就连相对简单的经验（例如“物体看来是红色的”——“红色的”似乎只是我们“给予的”）的地位也是一种被我们凭经验赋予的地位：事物之所以在我们“看来”是红色的是因为我们根据颜色概念来理解某物，是因为我们根据比如下列的东西来理解某物：“在这些光照的条件下确实作为红色的东西看来的状况”等等。
Indeed, articulating the third principle gave Fichte so much trouble that during his development of it over the course of several years, he came to hold that the “I” could never theoretically demonstrate the full constructibility of the “Not-I” out of itself but must instead take it as a practical and infinite task to be achieved, thus leading himself to assert that the demands of practical reason were prior to the claims of theoretical reason - that “dogmatism” (the acceptance of the “Not-I” as a brute “given”) could not be overcome theoretically but only practically.''’
实际上，由于系统论述第三条原理给费希特带来这么多麻烦，在他对第三条原理加以阐述的多年间，他逐渐认识到“自我”绝不可能理论上证明出之于“自我”自身的“非我”的充分可建构性，反而必须将可建构性看作一项有待完成的实践的和巨大的任务，这就从而致使他自己坚定地断言，实践理性的要求先于理论理性的主张——“独断论”（承认“非我”作为无理性的“给予物”的“独断论”）不可能被从理论上加以克服而只能被从实践上加以克服。
Fichte radicalized the Kantian idea of the “spontaneity” of the subject in synthesizing his experiences - the idea of a spontaneity that lay at the heart of all experience and theoretical knowledge - in a way such that even the notion of our own experiential passivity is something that we spontaneously “posit” for ourselves, and he took to describing the awareness of this radical, self-positing spontaneity as “intellectual intuition,” a kind of nonrepresentational awareness of our own activity of representing.'’ In Fichte’s hands, the joint ideas of the revisability of all our experience and our freedom in doing so - our “boundless” spontaneity which can only be 5^^bounded — became the hallmarks of what it would actually take to complete the Kantian project. The opposite view, that of taking the world as externally acting upon us and generating beliefs and actions in us, was characterized by Fichte as “dogmatism.”'* Fichte’s obscure but nonetheless powerful and highly original development of Kantian philosophy away from all reliance on “givens” quickly transformed what had been an Enlightenment ideal into something else: a Romantic exploration and celebration of freedom itself.
费希特以某种方式使康德关于主体在综合经验时的“自发性”概念——一个处于全部经验和理论知识中心的自发性概念——变得激进化，所以甚至我们自己的经验被动性概念也成了某种被“我们”自发地为我们自己“设定”的东西，他开始把这基本的、自我设定的自发性意识说成是“理智直观”，说成是一种关于我们自己的表象活动的非表象意识。在费希特手里，像上述这样做的过程中，我们的全部经验和自由的修订这一结合概念——我们只能自我限制的“无限的”自发性——变成实际上可以看作使康德哲学计划臻于完美的标志。相反的看法，把世界当作外在地影响我们且使我们产生信念与行为的看法，被费希特描述为“独断论”。费希特对康德哲学作出晦涩但仍然有力和高度原创性的阐发，以及完全使康德哲学摆脱对“给予物”的依赖，很快把早已成为启蒙运动理想的东西变成某种其他的东西：一种对自由本身的浪漫主义的探索和颂扬。
Schelling and the Romantic Turn in Idealism
谢林与唯心主义浪漫转向
If Fichte set the tone, Schelling helped to raise the stakes (and the embellishment of the language in which it was described) of philosophical idealism. Schelling was the quintessential Romantic. Experimental in temperament, always focused on the large view rather than the fine details, throwing off brilliant insights along the way, Schelling quickly became “the” philosopher for the Romantic circle that had formed at Jena, especially after Fichte’s spectacular dismissal from the university surrounding the charges of his alleged “atheism.” During that early period in Jena, Schelling’s thought developed rapidly, his publications were coming out as fast as he could write them, and each one, so it seemed, took a stance slightly different from the earlier ones. After his own rise to fame later in Berlin, Hegel was to offer a withering observation on much of his old friend’s output during this period: “Schelling conducted his philosophical education in public.”'"
如果费希特为唯心主义哲学定下了调，那么谢林就举起唯心主义哲学大旗（并提供哲学唯心主义被借以描述的语言装饰品）。谢林是位典型的浪漫主义者。由于秉性喜爱实验，由于总是大处着眼而非盯住细枝末节，由于频频发表卓越的洞见，谢林很快成了那在耶拿形成的浪漫主义者同仁圈中“独一无二”的哲学家，特别是在费希特因四面受到对他所谓“无神论”的指责而突遭耶拿大学解雇后，谢林更显得是鹤立鸡群。在耶拿时期，谢林思想发展非常之快，他的作品这边写出来那边就发表，似乎每篇作品都持有稍异于以前作品的立场。在他自己后来在柏林声名鹊起后，黑格尔势必注意到老友谢林在这个阶段著述甚丰，他自己深感自愧弗如：“谢林指挥着公共哲学教育。”
In the period from roughly 1794 to 1800, Schelling went through his rapid development. Beginning as a Spinozist, he quickly became a Fichtean; in 1795, he published Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge^ in which, although still appearing Fichtean in his overall argumentation (he still spoke of the “I’s” positing a “Not-I,” and so on), in fact he began to depart from Fichte’s thought in important ways. He then began to see the problems in Fichte’s own system, and by 1800 had published his System of Transcendental Idealism in which he articulated his own distinctive Romantic post-Fichtean form of idealism. Schelling drew out what he took to be the central principle of Fichte’s development of idealism and phrased it in a way that was to appeal to his Romantic admirers: “The beginning and end of all philosophy is - freedoml"
在大约从 1794 年至 1800 年这个时期，谢林完成了他哲学思想的快速发展。尽管开始是个斯宾诺莎主义者，他仍然很快就成了个费希特主义者；在 1795 年，他发表《关于作为哲学原理的自我或论无条件的人类知识》这本书，在该书中，虽然他的整个论证仍然显露出费希特主义面孔（他依然述及“自我”设定“非我”等等），实际上他在某些重要方面却着手脱离费希特思想影响。他继而开始看出费希特自己体系中的问题，到 1800 年他就已发表了他的《先验唯心主义体系》这本著作，在该著中，他系统地阐述他自己那别具一格的、浪漫主义的、后费希特哲学的唯心主义形式。谢林制定出被他看作的费希特唯心主义阐述的核心原理，并以一种旨在诉诸浪漫主义赞赏者的方式来叙述这样的核心原理：“一切哲学的开端和结尾都是一一自由。”
Just as Fichte had radicalized Kant, Schelling radicalized Fichte. Fichte had spoken of how the “F’ necessarily posits for itself a “Not-F’ to account for its own activity; but Fichte’s “I,” Schelling argued, remained conditioned by something else. What was at stake, even on Fichte’s own terms, was the status of the “unconditioned” in our activities of self-positing, and Schelling took to calling this unconditioned totality at first the “absolute F’ and later simply “Being.”^' Likewise, Schelling radicalized Fichte’s notion of “intellectual intuition,” claiming that apprehension of the full, unconditioned freedom of the “absolute F’ was such a nondiscursive “intellectual intuition” and drawing the conclusion that since the “ultimate goal of the finite I is therefore an expansion toward identity with the nonfinite,” the “ultimate goal of all striving can also be represented as an expansion of personality to infinity, that is, as its own destruction.”^^ Fichte’s “infinite task” of overcoming all reliance on any “given” had suddenly been given a much more religious, even existential and Romantic twist.
正像费希特早已把康德激进化一样，谢林也使费希特激进化。费希特早就述及“自我”怎么必须为它自己设定一个“非我”以说明它自己的活动；但是费希特的“自我”，谢林辩称，依然受到其他东西的制约。很成问题的是，用费希特自己术语说，是“无条件者”在我们自我设定活动中的地位。谢灵起初喜爱把无条件的总体称作“绝对自我”，后来把无条件的总体简称作“存在”。同样，谢灵使费希特的“理智直观”概念激进化，声称对“绝对自我”的充分的无条件自由的领悟是这样一种非推论的“理智直观”，并得出结论：“有限自我的终极目的因此是向非限定的同一的扩展，所以一切努力的终极目的也可以被说成是人格向无限的扩展，也即也可以被说成是它自己的毁灭。”费希特关于克服对任何“给予物”的全面依赖的“无限任务”早就出人意料地被赋予一种更加宗教的、甚至存在主义和浪漫主义的扭曲。
However, Schelling himself became worried within a very short time about some of his own conclusions, and began working out what became known as the “philosophy of nature” {Naturphilosophie). Schelling thus embarked on his ambitious and greatly influential project of showing how the nature studied by the physicists was itself possible only if there was a “Nature” to be uncovered a priori by the philosophers that made it possible.“
然而，谢灵本人在短时间内担心起他自己的某些结论，并着手制定著名的“自然哲学”（Naturphilosophie）。谢灵因此启动他雄心勃勃的、颇具影响的计划，该计划在于证明那由物理学家研究的自然本身是如何绝不可能存在的，除非存在着一个有待某些哲学家去揭示的先天的“自然”，而且他们使这样的“自然”成为可能。
One of the key notions in Schelling’s philosophy of nature (which was crucial for the development of Hegel’s thought in his early writings in Jena) was his idea that nature divides itself into various “potencies” (Potenzen). (The term Potenz was taken from the mathematical use of “power,” as when one speaks of 4 being 2 to the “second power. Schelling’s general idea was roughly the following: An investigation of nature finds that nature necessarily divides itself up into various op- posed “potencies” out of a primordial unity that contains a primordial opposition {Ur-Gegensatz) within itself. One of the guiding images at work in Schelling’s reflections, as in so many other writings of the period, was that of the magnet: The magnet has positive and negative poles, but the poles are not self-subsistent; they exist only in terms of being united within the whole magnet. If one cuts a magnet in half, one does not have two magnet parts, one with a positive pole and one with a negative pole; one has two magnets, each with positive and negative poles. Each pole therefore can exist only when united with its opposite. Schelling called this union the “indifference point” (for example, the point at which the magnet is neither positive nor negative). Each “potency” involves opposites that attract each other (like the positive and negative poles of a magnet), and nature progresses from simple to complex forms by multiplying its “potencies”; when the opposites come together, they multiply each other’s “potencies,” and the result is a new, higher, more “potent” natural form. Nature is inherently productive and develops of itself all these stages by virtue of its productivity, being spurred on by self-produced “checks” in nature that oppose such expansive, productive forces. (Schelling in fact tried to work out a kind of algebra for this conception of oppositions and potencies in nature, a formalism taken up by his less inspired imitators but which he himself soon discarded.)
谢林（对黑格尔耶拿早期作品中思想发展至关重要的）自然哲学的关键概念之一是谢林关于自然把自己分成各种不同“潜力”（Potenzen）的思想。（“Potenz”这一术语取自数学中使用的“乘方”，像当一个人述及4是2的“2次方”时一样。）谢林总的思想可粗略地叙述如下：对自然的研究使人发现大自然必然由于一个自身含有原始对立面（Ur-Gegensatz）的原始单位而把自己分成各种不同的对立的“乘方”。在谢林反思中起作用的指导性概念之一，像在那时其他许多著作中一样，是磁铁这一概念：磁铁具有正极和负极，但正负极不是自立的；它们只有从结合在整块磁铁中意义上说才是存在的。如果把一块磁铁切成两段，那么就得不到两段磁铁，一段带有正极而另一段带有负极；如果人们有两块磁铁，那么每一块磁铁都有着正极和负极。因此每一极能够存在，只有当每一极都与它相反的一极结合在一起的时候。谢林把这种统一称为“无差异点”（例如在这一点上磁铁既不是正极也不是负极）。每个“潜力”都涉及一些相互吸引的对立面（像一块磁铁中的正极和负极一样的对立面），自然借助乘以它的“次方”而不断从简单的形式发展到复杂的形式；当这些对立面合为一体的时候，它们乘以彼此的“次方”，结果产生一种新的、更高的、更“有力的”自然形式。自然天生是多产的，并借助它的多产性而从它自身发展出这些阶段，这些阶段受到自然自我生产的“抑制”的促进，这样的“抑制”抵抗这些扩展的、多产的力量。（谢林其实试图创立一种关于自然中对立面和乘方概念的代数学，创立一种得到他缺乏灵感的模仿者接受的形式主义，但这样的形式主义不久便遭到他本人的抛弃。）
The various alleged “indifference points” to be found in nature are, however, all unstable; they are not genuine “indifference points,” since a genuine “indifference point” would mean the cessation of all development in nature. The only true “indifference point” would be the “absolute” itself out of which all the other various oppositions (and therefore “potencies”) of nature develop, but, as he put it, the “absolute indifference point exists nowhere, but is, as it were, distributed among several individual points,” which in turn ensures the boundlessness of the universe.
然而，见于自然中的各种不同的所谓“无差异点”全都是不稳定的；它们不是真正的“无差异点”，因为真正的“无差异点”或许意味着自然中一切发展的停止。唯一真正的“无差异点”当然是出于自然中一切其他不同的对立面（因此还有“次方”）的发展的“绝对”自身，但是，像他论述的，“绝对无差异点无处可寻，但似乎它分散在若干单个的点中”，这反过来又保证宇宙的无限性。
In asserting all this, Schelling denied the validity neither of experimental empirical science nor of empirical investigation - his focus was always on what he saw as the false picture of nature presented by atomism and by the purely mechanical understanding of matter - nor did he advocate any kind of spiritualist conception of nature. He would have nothing to do with those who postulated a “vital force” to explain the way life emerges out of “dead” matter.His point was always that the study of the “potencies” revealed the a priori presuppositions about nature involved in the empirical scientific study of nature.
在作出上述断言过程中，谢林既没有否定实验的经验科学的合法性，也没有否定经验研究的合法性——他的着眼点始终在于被他看作的由原子论和对物质作纯机械理解所描述的自然的错误图景——他也不主张任何种类的唯灵论的自然概念。他当然与那些要求把“生命力”解释成生命出于“死寂”物质的方面的人毫不相干。他的见解始终如一：对“乘方”的研究揭示对自然的先天预想涉及对自然作经验科学的研究。
Thus, so Schelling argued, post-Kantian idealism must pursue a double-edged strategy to avoid the skeptical charge. On the one hand, it must pursue the construction of the “Not-I” out of what the “I” finds necessary for its own self-identity, which culminates in a system of Kantian-Fichtean transcendental idealism. On the other hand, we must also develop a Naturphilosophie that shows how nature’s own dynamics require that it develop some “point” at which it can reflect on its own productive processes. At the end of both developments — transcendental idealism and Naturphilosophie — there is an “intellectual intuition” of the absolute, of a natural human creature nondiscursively intuiting the activity of nature’s freely determining itself to produce exactly those “points” at which nature comes within human selfconsciousness to a full consciousness of itself.
所以，谢林还坚持认为，后康德唯心主义必须追求一种双刃策略以避免怀疑主义的指责。一方面，后康德唯心主义必须追求出于“自我”所发现的它自己自我同一必需的“非我”的建构，这在康德—费希特先验唯心主义体系中达到了登峰造极的地步。另一方面，我们也必须发展一种自然哲学以表明自然自己的动力怎么需要它发展出某个“点”，而且在这个点上它能够反思它自己的多产的过程。在两种发展（先验唯心主义和自然哲学）的末端，存在着关于绝对的“理智直观”，存在着自然人的“理智直观”，自然人非推论地直觉感受到自然自由地决定它自己的活动以便精确地产生那些“点”，在这些点上，自然在人类自我意识领域逐渐充分地意识到它自身。
The absolute itself is therefore that unity that unites the subjective “F’ and nature itself, and, as the condition of everything else, it can only be the object of an “intellectual intuition.” Schelling took himself to have shown that the division between “subject” and “object” can only be the self-display of the absolute itself, which is itself neither subject nor object, and as neither subject nor object, cannot be the “object” of discursive thought or sensible intuition. Schelling almost immediately thereafter began calling this “absolute” the “absolute Identity,” and his philosophy became known as “Identity philosophy.”
所以，绝对自身是一种联合主观的“自我”和自然本身的统一，作为其他一切事物的条件，它只能是“理智直观”的对象。谢林自以为已经证明，区分“主体”和“客体”只能是绝对自身的自我炫耀，绝对自身既不是主体，也不是客体。绝对自身，作为既非主体亦非客体，不可能是推论式思想的对象，也不可能是感性直观的“对象”。谢林几乎立刻开始称“绝对”为“绝对同一”，他的哲学以“同一哲学”闻名于世。
But if the absolute is the object of neither thought nor sensibility, then of what faculty is it the object? Schelling concluded in his System of Transcendental Idealism that it could only be the “object” of imagination, and in particular, of artistic imagination. The artistic genius, as it were, “shows” us what cannot be “said.” In art we achieve the genuine “intellectual intuition” that shows us the unity of self-conscious life and nature, that shows us that we really are the way we must be if we are to be the free agents that we must think of ourselves as being. The hidden conclusion in all of this was of course the idea that those who did not “see” this, who did not have this kind of “intellectual intuition,” were those who were incapable of understanding and appreciating art in the first place. “Intellectual intuition” thus turned out to be available to the philosopher and the artist — who in these terms are conceived not so much as the “priests of truth,” as Fichte had described the philosopher, but more as a small circle of apostles of the absolute — and unavailable to those who are so mired in the finite that they cannot “see” what are the so-called necessary presuppositions are of their own selfconsciousness.
但是，如果绝对既不是思想的对象，也不是感觉的对象，那么它是何种官能的对象呢？谢林在他《先验唯心主义体系》中作出结论：绝对只可能成为想象力的“对象”，特别是，只可能成为艺术家想象力的“对象”。仿佛艺术家的创造力“向”我们“表明”什么不可能得到“言说”。在艺术中，我们所达到的真正的“理智直观”，向我们显露自觉生活与自然的统一，向我们显露我们确实行进在我们必须行进的途中，如果我们想要成为我们必须把我们自己看作自由行动者。隐含在上述论述中的结论当然是这样的想法：人们要是不“明白”以上的论述，要是不具有这种“理智直观”，肯定无法理解和欣赏艺术。所以，“理智直观”最终证明，只有哲学家和艺术家才具有——他们用“理智直观”这一术语来说话，甚至不被设想成“真理的祭司”，像费希特早已把哲学家说成的，而被设想成一小撮绝对的使徒——“理智直观”因此最终证明是下面这些人不具有的：他们深陷无限者泥潭，以致他们不可能“明白”所谓必需的预想是什么，他们因此成了他们自己的自我意识。
Schelling’s aesthetic turn in his understanding of the intuition of the “absolute” was combined, not unsurprisingly, with a very anticommercial understanding of the relations between modern society and such philosophical truths. As Henry Crabb Robinson, an English student at Jena (and one of the first to bring the “new philosophy” to English attention), put it in a letter to his brother in 1802, Schelling simply dismissed all empiricist English philosophy, indeed even England itself, with the assertion, “it is absurd to expect the science of beauty in a country that values the Mathematics only as it helps to make Spinning Jennies and & Stocking-weaving machines. And beauty only as it recommends their Manufactories abroad.”^’
谢林在他对“绝对”的直观理解过程中选择了美学转向，这样的美学转向是和下列东西结合在一起的，这确实是令人感到非常惊奇的：谢林对现代社会与这些哲学真理之间的关系作出了极其反商业的解读。像克利、克拉布、鲁宾逊这位耶拿时期的英国学生（兼使“新哲学”引起英国人注意的开先河者之一）在 1802 年致兄弟的信中论述的一样，谢林简直就不把一切英国经验论哲学放在眼里，实际上甚至连英国本身也不屑一顾。谢林同时断言：“期待美学出现在一个重视数学仅仅因为数学有助于创造斯皮宁、詹尼斯和斯托金纺织机的国家里，这是一件极其荒唐可笑的事情。而且人们之所以期待美学，仅仅是因为美学使他们的工厂在国外受到欢迎。”
Holderlin’s Philosophical Revolution and His Influence on Hegel
荷尔德林的哲学革命与他对黑格尔的影响
Although Schelling’s views obviously had quite an influence on the development of Hegel’s own philosophy, the genuine impetus for Hegel’s development of his own views was his encounter in Frankfurt with Hblderlin’s thoughts on Fichtean idealism. It is quite clear that in 1795, Holderlin belonged to an animated circle in Jena involved in serious conversation about Fichte’s idealism and its relation to Kant. The best surviving evidence of Holderlin’s own entry into that debate consists of a short fragment of two pages titled (not by him but by his editors) “Judgment and Being” (“t/rto7 und Sein")}^ Although Holderlin never published it - the very existence of the piece itself was not even known until 1961 - Holderlin almost certainly discussed the ideas in it with Hegel, and it was those ideas that decisively turned Hegel away from the direction he had been taking at Berne. As Holderlin reconstructed things, Fichte’s three principles could be understood as falling into a schema of unity, sundering of the unity, and restoration of the unity (of the “I,” the “Not-I,” and the infinite progress). Holderlin argued, however, that the initial principle itself (the principle of self-positing self-consciousness, which Fichte characterized as “I = I”) could not in fact be the “absolute beginning” because self-consciousness already involves a “division” of itself from itself: The self (the “subject” of awareness) becomes aware of itself as an “object” of awareness. The first principle, therefore, cannot be “absolute,” since it already contains an “opposition” within itself.
虽然谢林的见解明显对黑格尔自己的哲学发展产生了相当大的影响，但真正推动黑格尔自己见解向前发展的却是他在法兰克福时期遇到的荷尔德林对费希特唯心主义所作的某些思考。十分清楚的是，在 1795 年，荷尔德林属于一个在耶拿十分活跃的同仁圈中的成员，这个同仁圈卷入一场关于费希特唯心主义和它与康德关系的严肃的对话。荷尔德林自己卷入那场争论的现存最好证据在于只有两页纸的题为“判断与存在”（Urteil und Sein）的简短残篇（不是他而是他著作编纂者加上去的题目）。虽然荷尔德林生前从未发表这个残篇——这篇作品本身确实存世甚至直到 1961 年时一直不为人知——但是荷尔德林几乎无疑跟黑格尔探讨过其中的某些观念，正是那些观念对黑格尔脱离他早在伯尔尼时期就一直秉持的思想方向起到了决定性的作用。像荷尔德林重建某些东西一样，费希特的三条原理可解读为分成统一的图式、统一的分裂和统一的恢复（“自我”、“非我”和无限过程的统一）。然而，荷尔德林辩称，初始原理本身（自我设定自我意识的原理，此原理被费希特描述成“自我=自我”）之所以实际上不可能是“绝对开端”，是因为自我意识已经涉及根据它自身对它自身的“分切”：自我（意识的“主体”）意识到它自己是意识的“对象”。所以，第一条原理不可能是“绝对”的，因为它在自身中已经含有“对立”。
Holderlin was proposing, as it turned out, something vaguely similar to what Schelling was about to propose at the same time (although it is unclear if Holderlin was aware at that point of Schelling’s own attempt).^'' Holderlin argued that the way in which Fichte had separated the “subject” from the “object” - that is, the way in which he had radicalized the Kantian project - made it impossible to see how such a separated “subject” and “object” could ever get back together again. Fichte’s solution - that it was the subject’s own activity that did this, that the “subject” was the “absolute” ground of this - seemed wrong because the “subject” itself did not appear even to itself to be absolute but rather to refer to something else which was deeper and more fundamental than itself. The separation of “subject” and “object,” Holderlin concluded, was only the expression of a much deeper unity, which Holderlin called (following Spinoza and Jacobi) “Being.”^“ “Consciousness,” in Hblderlin’s treatment, as a relation of “subject” to “object” could not itself be basic; it had to derive from a yet more basic unity, a more basic apprehension on our part of something that, prior to all our particular orientations, served to orient us in general. Before we can deliberate on anything, we must already be oriented toward some terms that guide that deliberation and which are not themselves established by deliberation; that fundamental standpoint within our own consciousness out of which we orient ourselves was the “one,” “Being,” that of which we are experientially aware but of which we cannot be explicitly, fully conscious, since consciousness already presupposes a split between “subject” and “object,” between our being able to discriminate between our subjective experience of something and the object of that experience (between, for example, our experience of a tree and the tree itself). This “one” forms a kind of “horizon” of our consciousness without itself being an object of that consciousness, and the key to all of this lay in our own judgmental activities, in our own attempts at articulating judgments that “get it right” about ourselves and the world.
荷尔德林提出的东西，像结果证明的，大体上类似于谢林同时将要提出的东西（尽管尚不清楚荷尔德林是否意识到谢林自己试图提出的观点）。荷尔德林论证道，一种早就被费希特借以把“主体”和“客体”隔开的方法——也即一种被他借以把康德计划激进化的方法——使我们不可能看出这样一种被分隔的“主体”和“客体”怎么可能有时再度聚首。费希特对这个问题的解决办法——正是主体自身的活动可能使“主体”和“客体”有时再度聚首，换句话说，“主体”构成使“主体”和“客体”再度聚首的“绝对”基础——之所以看来好像是错误的，是因为“主体”自身甚至在它自己看来不是绝对的，而涉及比它自己更为深度的和更为基础的其他东西。“主体”和“客体”的分隔，荷尔德林断言，只不过表述的是一种更具有深度的统一，这种统一被荷尔德林（步斯宾诺莎和雅科比后尘）称作“存在”。意识，在荷尔德林论述中，作为使“主体”和“客体”相联系的东西，自身不可能被称作基本的东西；意识必须源自一个更基本的统一体，必须源自一种更基本的领悟，就某种先于我们全部具体定位的、通常被用作给我们定位的东西而言。在我们能够仔细思考事物之前，我们必然已被使得适应某些术语，这些术语引导我们思考，它们本身不为思考所确立；我们自己意识领域的基本观点出之于我们为我们自己定向的东西，这样的基本观点是“一”、“存在”，以及被我们通过经验意识到的但不可能被我们明确地充分地意识到的东西，原因在于，意识已经预先假定了“主体”和“客体”之间存在着一种分裂，并已经预先假定了在我们关于某物的主观经验与经验的对象之间（例如我们关于一棵树的经验与这棵树本身之间）存在着一种能被我们区别的分裂。这“一”构成一种关于我们意识的“视域”，而“一”本身不构成我们意识的对象。所有这些的关键在于我们自己的判断活动，在于我们自己在尝试系统论述一些可以“使我们正确理解”关于我们自己和世界的判断。
This implied that Reinhold’s and Fichte’s search for a “first princi- pie” in philosophy was itself already doomed, since there could be no such first principle; instead, there could only be a prior, holistic predeliberative orientation within some “whole” that included our consciousness and its objects within itself. Fichte’s notion that the “I” must posit the “Not-I” was thus also doomed: It assumed that one side of the relation had to do all the work, as it were, when in fact we begin with a unity of thought and being that precedes all reflection on it. Neither the “subject” nor the “object” has any “original” determinateness on its own that would serve to ground or establish the determinateness of the other; if “realists” make the mistake of thinking that the “world” bestows determinateness on thought, “subjective idealists” such as Fichte make the mistake of thinking that thought imposes all the determinateness on the world. Neither “subject” nor “object” is primary or originary, and we must accept that we are always in touch with the world in all its general outlines. This acceptance necessarily precedes all our reflection, including even our various skeptical doubts about it. That we have a sense of the “whole” that includes us, even if we cannot at first articulate it (except perhaps poetically), was the implication of Holderlin’s reflections.^^
这就暗示赖因霍尔德和费希特从事哲学“第一原理”的研究本身是已经注定是失败的，因为根本不可能存在着这样的第一原理；反倒可能只存在着先天的整体论者事先考虑过的某种“整体”中定位，而且这种“整体”包含意识和意识自身领域的对象。费希特关于“自我”必须设定“非我”的看法因此也注定是不能成立的：这种看法假定“自我”和“非我”的关系的一个方面必须是万应灵丹，好像其时实际上我们从思维与存在的统一开始，而且这种统一先于对费希特上述看法的全部反思。“主体”和“客体”都不具有任何“原初的”独立的确定性，而且这种确定性总是被用作基于或确立他者的确定性；如果说“实在主义者”错误地认为“世界”把确定性给予思想的话，那么“主观唯心主义者”例如费希特就错误地认为思想把一切确定性强加给世界。“主体”和“客体”都不是原始的或原初的东西，我们因此必须承认我们总是与世界保持着联系，通常从世界的全部概括意义上说是这样。这种承认必须先于我们的一切反思，甚至必须先于包括我们对世界的各种不同的怀疑论式的怀疑。我们能够理解一个包含我们在内的“整体”，纵使我们起初不可能阐明这个“整体”（或许除了诗意地阐明这个“整体”外），这就牵涉荷尔德林的深刻思考。
Holderlin’s reflections on Fichte and on the development of idealism in general had no less than an explosive impact on Hegel. In Berne, as Hegel had set himself to completing the Kantian program by applying it, he had dismissed Fichte’s and Reinhold’s works as being merely of interest to theoretical reason alone. Hegel’s own concern up until that point had been rather straightforwardly with the idea of the selfimposition of the moral law, with how that might be “applied” to history to show how Christianity had become a positive religion, and how mankind had, in Kant’s words, thereby imposed a form of tutelage on itself. In all these cases, though, Hegel’s diagnosis of the problem had landed him at a theoretical dead end. Now, under the influence of Holderlin, he saw how his project of applying the Kantian idea of selfimposition to specific social problems (particularly those connected with the Revolution) had in fact begged the question of what constituted self-imposition in the first place, indeed, had begged the question about all our judgmental activities. Fichte had shown that the theme of selfdetermination, if taken seriously, had to be developed on its own, and by virtue of his own difficulties in working out his system, had shown that it was not a self-evident idea that could simply be “applied.” Holderlin had now indicated to him not only that Fichte’s own philosophy had deeper problems within itself, but also that something like even a history of Christianity could not be understood outside of some deeper understanding of the kind of prereflective situating that goes on in conscious life before more determinate plans and projects are laid out. Hegel also came to see under Holderlin’s guidance that idealism as it had been developing could not be written off as ignoring the more experiential aspects of human life; at the heart of conscious life itself was an element of spontaneous activity that was not simply the application of underived conceptual form to given sensuous content. “Subjective religion,” as a way of orienting people’s “hearts,” required some account of how we orient our conscious lives in the first place, and Holderlin had shown that a full account of that was still outstanding.
荷尔德林对费希特和唯心主义发展作出的通盘思考可与他对黑格尔产生的爆炸性影响相比肩。早在伯尔尼时期，当黑格尔打算借助运用康德哲学来使康德哲学臻于完美的时候，黑格尔就已对费希特和赖因霍尔德著作抱有抵触情绪，因为这两人著作仅仅对理论理性本身感兴趣。黑格尔自己关心的观念到那时已经和盘托出：道德律的自我强加，道德律的自我强加怎么可能被“应用”于历史以证明基督教如何早就成了实定宗教，以及人类怎么（用康德的话说）因此把法律的形式强加给它自身。不过，在上述这些情况下，黑格尔对问题的诊断使他陷入理论上的僵局。那时，在荷尔德林影响下，他看出他关于把康德的自我强加观念应用于具体社会问题（特别是与法国大革命相联系的问题）的计划实际上如何回避了某些首先构成自我强加的东西的问题，更确切地说如何回避了我们一切判断活动的问题。费希特已经证明，自我决定的主题，如果严肃对待它，必须被独立地阐述，而且，由于他自己在创立体系过程中遇到的诸多困难，费希特证明自我决定的主题不是一个只可被“应用”的不证自明的观念。荷尔德林现早已向他表明，不但费希特自己的哲学自身具有更深度的问题，而且甚至像基督教历史的东西在下列情况下也不可能被人理解：不具有对那种前反思式情境的某些更深程度的理解，这种情境在更加确定的计划和方案被制定出之前继续存在于自觉的生活中。黑格尔同时逐渐看出，在荷尔德林引领下，唯心主义因为一直在发展，所以不可能被一笔勾销，也不可能忽视人类生活更为经验的方面；处在自觉生活本身中心的是不仅仅把原初概念形式应用于给定的感性内容的自发活动元素。“主观宗教”，作为定位人“心”的方式，需要对我们如何首先定位我们的自觉生活作出释述，荷尔德林向世人证明，他本人对我们如何首先定位我们的自觉生活作出了充分的释述，这项工作在他那个时代仍然是非常出众的。
As Hegel absorbed Holderlin’s radical ideas, it became clear to him that his whole project of staging a career as a Lessing-like “educator of the people” was coming to a crashing end, since he had been trying to “apply” a set of ideas that were themselves already deeply in conflict with each other. If he really wanted to do what he set out to do, he simply was going to have to do things differently, and that realization shifted Hegel’s course onto the path he was finally to take.
当黑格尔吸收荷尔德林的激进想法的时候，在他看来十分清楚的是，他关于未来过着莱辛式的“人民教育家”生活的全部计划逐渐显露出泡汤的苗头，因为他长期以来一直在试图“应用”的一系列思想本身已处于深度的相互冲突中。如果他真要去做他打算做的事情，那么他只不过打算必须做不同的事情，而这一愿望的实现改变了黑格尔在通往他最终选择的道路上的进程。
“The Oldest System Program of German Idealism”
《德国唯心主义最早体系纲领》
Around this time Hegel wrote out a short manuscript which has come to be known as “The Oldest System Program of German Idealism.” (It is usually dated 1797.) The essay is very short and contains little argument; instead, it contents itself with simply announcing various lines of thought and with indicating in a sketchy way how they might possibly fit together in some future development. Although the manuscript is in Hegel’s own handwriting, it is by no means clear that it his own creation, and the question of its actual authorship has always remained a matter of controversy. In fact, it was originally attributed to Schelling, although for a while much scholarly opinion shifted to the view that attributes authorship of the piece to Hegel himself; the author, however, is most likely Holderlin.
大约在这一时期，黑格尔写出了一篇内容很短的手稿，它就是现已众所周知的《德国唯心主义最早体系纲领》（现时它通常被标注的写作时间是 1797 年）。这篇论文很短，几乎不含论证；恰恰相反，它只是满足于提出各种不同的思路和速写式地表明这些不同思路如何可能完全适合将来的某种发展。虽然这份手稿系黑格尔自己的手迹，但绝不意味着它显然就是他自己创作的作品，有关它的实际归属问题仍然一直是众说纷纭，莫衷一是。实际上，手稿最初被认为是谢林的作品，尽管有段时间很多学者的意见转向这样的看法，认为这篇作品是黑格尔本人的；不过，它的作者很可能是荷尔德林。